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The Crimes Against the Unborn Child
Act: Recognizing Potential Human
Life in Pennsylvania Criminal Law
I. Introduction
On June 29, 1997, near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Jeffrey R.
Booth ran a stop sign while drunk and wrecked into a minivan
driven by Nancy Boehm who was at the time eight months
pregnant.' Physicians were unable to save the unborn child named
Jason who died of head and abdominal injuries.2 In what can be
considered as a landmark case in Pennsylvania, Booth was charged
with vehicular homicide for the death of a fetus.
Since colonial times, Pennsylvania criminal law has specifically
maintained that it is not murder to kill a fetus.4 Now, after three
centuries, this rule has been dramatically altered in Pennsylvania
through the enactment of The Crimes Against the Unborn Child
Act (the Act).' By passing the Act, Pennsylvania has aligned
itself with twenty-five other states, who have also adopted fetal-
homicide laws.6
Consequently, those who assault a pregnant woman and cause
the death of her fetus will no longer escape criminal prosecution.
More importantly, while extending the protection of state criminal
laws to a human fetus, the Act deems a fetus to be a human being
from conception and a person in the eyes of the criminal courts.'
1. See Death of Fetuses May Set Precedent: Two Drivers Charged with Homicide, LAN-
CASTER INTELLIGENCER J., July 11, 1997, at A3.
2. See id.
3. See J. Kenneth Evans, Man Charged in Death of Fetus, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
July 10, 1997, at D12.
4. See Death of Fetuses May Set Precedent: Two Drivers Charged with Homicide, supra
note 1, at A3.
5. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998).
6. See Jeanette Krebs, Fetal-Safety Bill Goes to Ridge: Harm to Unborn in an Attack
on Woman Would Be a Crime, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Sept. 23, 1997, at Al.
7. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2603-2605.
8. See Frank Reeves, House Approves Bill to Penalize Killers of Unborn Children,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 23, 1997, at B8.
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This characterization of the fetus as a human being in criminal law
has left room for powerful debate.9 Some have decried the Act as
a backdoor attempt to make abortions illegal.1" For this reason,
the issue of fetal rights within the criminal courts could become the
next battleground for Pennsylvania's pro-life and pro-choice forces
in a state that already boasts one of the harshest abortion laws.l a
Other critics of the law fear that, while intended to protect
pregnant women, the law could be used against them by exposing
those who are alcoholics or drug addicts to prosecution.
12
This Comment analyzes the current legal status of a human
fetus in Pennsylvania criminal law as a result of the development
of The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act. Part II of this
Comment examines the common law "Born Alive" rule. Addition-
ally, this section surveys recent developments in other states
regarding the legal status of a fetus in criminal law. Part III
discusses the evolution of fetal rights in Pennsylvania prior to the
enactment of the Act. Part IV explores The Crimes Against the
Unborn Child Act and compares it with the fetal homicide
legislation of other states. Part V considers the impact the law will
have on society and criminal prosecutions in Pennsylvania.
Specifically, this section focuses on the Act's future implications
with respect to legalized abortion and the prosecution of pregnant
women who have harmed their own fetuses. This Comment
contends that upon review in Pennsylvania's criminal courts, the
Act will surpass constitutional challenges.
9. See Bill to Punish Fetal Homicide Poorly Done, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Sept.
28,1997, at A26; Jeanette Krebs, Senate Backs Fetal Rights from Conception; Ridge-Endorsed
Bill with Criminal Penalties Sent to House for Concurrence on Wording, THE HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, June 11, 1997, at Al; Legislative Mischief- Penalties for Fetal Homicide Appear
Aimed at Muddying Abortion Waters, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 2, 1997, at A14;
Heidi Russell, House Sends Ridge Fetus Murder Bill. The Bill Would Give an "Unborn
Child" the Status of a Person, YORK DAILY RECORD, Sept. 23, 1997, at 2; State Bill on Fetal
Death is Mischief, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, May 1, 1997, at A22.
10. See Krebs, supra note 9, at Al.
11. See Alison Delsite, When Does Life Begin?, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Dec. 15,
1996, at Fl.
12. See id.; see also Aaron Epstein, Rulings Enhancing Fetuses' Legal Status as "Person."
At Least Thirty States Allow Prosecutions for Criminally Causing Death or Injury to Someone
Else's Unborn Child, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Aug. 1, 1996, at A10.
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II. Fetal Rights
A. The Common Law "Born Alive" Rule
According to English common law, "homicide" was defined as
the killing of one human being by another. 3 Because a fetus was
not considered a "person" or a "reasonable creature in being"
before birth, the killing of an unborn child was not regarded as
homicide.14 Thus, the child must have been born alive and have
existed independently of the mother's body before the child was
thought to be a "person" within the confines of the law of
homicide.15 Sir Edward Coke, a noted seventeenth century author
on the common law principles governing fetal homicide, maintained
that the killing of a quick, but unborn child "is a great misprision,
and no murder; but if the childe be born alive, and dyeth ... this
is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum
natura, when it is born alive.'
' 6
The historical basis of the born alive rule was developed out
of a lack of sophisticated medical knowledge. 7 Prior to modern
medical techniques, whether a woman was pregnant was difficult to
determine since many of the symptoms associated with pregnancy
had other causes."i The live birth 9 of a child removed any doubt
13. See Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40
A.L.R.3D 444, 446 (1971).
14. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 9 (1968).
15. See Mary E. Barrazotto, Note, Judicial Recognition of Feticide: Usurping the Power
of the Legislature?, 24 J. FAM. L. 43, 45 (1986).
16. Id. In the Eighteenth Century, Coke's requirement that an infant be born alive in
order to be the subject of homicide was reiterated by Sir Edward Blackstone. Blackstone
stated that "Itlo kill a child in its mother's womb is now no murder, but a great misprision:
but if the child be born alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the
womb, it is murder in such as administered or gave them." Clark D. Forsythe, Homicide of
the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV.
563, 585 (1987) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1765 ed.)); see also Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1970).
17. See Forsythe, supra note 16, at 571. The phrase in rerum natura means "in the
nature of things" or "in existence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See Forsythe, supra note 16, at 571.
19. Live birth is the objective clinical observation that a fetus, upon exiting the womb,
is alive. See id. at 568. A live birth is recorded when the infant breathes spontaneously or
shows any other indication of life such as a heart beat or definite spontaneous movement of
voluntary muscles. See id. Live birth does not imply a viable fetus nor is it synonymous with
pregnancy brought to full term. See id.
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of actual pregnancy while establishing clinical proof that the child
was alive.2°
The born alive rule was adopted by American courts for
numerous reasons.21 First, since medical science lacked sophisti-
cated techniques in the area of forensic medicine, the born alive
rule conferred "the important nexus between the conduct of the
defendant and the death of the fetus., 22 Furthermore, a presump-
tion existed that the fetus would not be born alive as a result of the
high prenatal mortality rates. 23  Finally, it was presumed that a
woman was incapable of acting rationally during childbirth and as
a result she was excused from killing her fetus. 24  In light of
medical and scientific technology, however, the rationales for
applying the born alive rule are now obsolete.25 Medical science
has developed to the point that it is presumed that a viable fetus
will be born alive.26 While some states still apply the born alive
rule,' the trend in most states has been to abandon the rule altogether. 8
20. See id. at 568.




25. See id. at 46.
26. See Barrazotto, supra note 15, at 46. Today, the unborn child is portrayed as "the
second patient." See Forsythe, supra note 16, at 576. Through the use of ultrasound, fetal
heart monitoring, fetoscopy, and in vitro fertilization, there is an understanding of fetal
development. See id.
27. See, e.g., Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam) (holding
that the term "minor child" under the state's law does not include a fetus that dies before
becoming able to live outside the mother's womb); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585
(Ark. 1987) (holding that a viable fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
manslaughter statute); State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511, 517 (Kan. 1988) (holding that a viable
fetus was not a "human being" within the meaning of the aggravated vehicular homicide
statute); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1983) (stating that destroying the
life of viable fetus was not considered murdering a "person"); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1
(N.C. 1989) (noting that the state still follows the common law rule that murder does not
include killing of a viable, unborn child); State v. Oliver, 563 A.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Vt. 1989)
(noting that a viable fetus is not a person for purposes of laws that criminalize the act of
causing death as a result of motor vehicle laws); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156, 157
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (deciding that an unborn, but viable, stillborn fetus was not a
"human being" within the meaning of the homicide statute); State v. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d
434, 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179-80 (Co. Ct. 1987)
(indicating that unborn fetus could not be the subject of a charge of manslaughter in the
second degree).
28. See, e.g., infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. In the criminal law context, the
case most frequently cited to support the abandonment of the born alive rule is Common-
wealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984). In Cass, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
expressly rejected the born alive rule. See id. at 1329. While admitting that the common law
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B. Survey of Fetal Rights in the States
Without ever seeing the light of day, or extracting a breath of
fresh air, a fetus is gradually acquiring legal protection as a
"person" in the United States.29  By way of legislation 30 or court
decisions, half the fifty states prohibit the killing of a fetus outside
the domain of legal abortion.3' In every state, infanticide, the
killing of a newborn, is considered homicide.32 If an infant takes
one breath, the infant is legally a child who has been murdered.33
forbade charging a defendant with homicide for the death of a fetus, Chief Justice Edward
Hennessey, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, stated:
[T]he antiquity of a rule is no measure of its soundness. "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past."
Id. at 1328 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897)).
29. See Epstein, supra note 12, at A10.
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5) (West 1989) (defining "manslaughter"
to include "[k]nowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child ... by any
physical injury to the mother"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-80 (1988) (stating that feticide is the willful killing of a child "quick," or alive in the
mother's womb); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 1996) (creating the crime of
"intentional homicide of an unborn child"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 1985)
(imposing criminal liability for causing death of a fetus at any state of development); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (stating that any person who intentionally terminates a
pregnancy after the end of the second trimester in which the death of the fetus results
commits feticide); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2(7), 14:32.5-.8 (West 1991); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.554 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (prohibiting the "willful killing of an unborn, 'quick'
child"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266-8 (West 1987) (establishing separate homicide statutes
encompassing unborn children); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-.01-12.1-17.1-04 (1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-6 (Michie 1988)
(setting up penalty for intentional killing of fetus); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1990)
(including viable fetus within protection of criminal homicide laws); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-201 (1990) (including unborn child within protections of criminal homicide law); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9(A) .32.060 (1996) (stating that the intentional and unlawful killing of an
unborn, "quick" child by inflicting injury upon the mother is manslaughter).
31. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994) (ruling that it is murder to kill a
fetus when the fetus has progressed beyond embryonic state of seven-eight weeks);
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571, 575-76 (Mass. 1989) (stating that a viable fetus
is a person for purposes of common law crime of murder); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318.
321 (Minn. 1990) (deciding that unborn child homicide statute was not unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that
the killing of a viable fetus constituted homicide); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 731 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1994).
32. See Delsite, supra note 11, at Fl.
33. See id.
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Many states have enacted separate fetal homicide statutes that
criminalize the killing of a fetus from the time of conception34 or
from the state of quickening.35 California criminalizes the killing
of a fetus that has progressed beyond the embryonic state of seven
to eight weeks.3 6 A few states have amended their homicide
statutes to include the separate category of fetus. 37 In some states
it is a crime for a mother to kill her own viable fetus;38 while
others, Minnesota for example, forbid prosecution of the mother.39
Furthermore, some states including Oklahoma,4" South Caroli-
na,41 and Massachusetts, 42 do not have fetal homicide legislation,
but consider the killing of a viable fetus murder as the result of
landmark court decisions.
34. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2; MINN. STAT. ANN. 609.266-.2662.
35. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 731 (West 1983).
Quickening has been defined as "the signs of life felt by the mother as a result of the fetal
movements, usually noted from 16-20 weeks of pregnancy." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DiCrio-
NARY 1479 (26th ed. 1995).
36. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994). In dissent, Justice Moss
characterized the court's holding as broadening murder to include the killing of "a tiny alien
creature . . . an object the size of a peanut." Id. at 615 (Moss, J., dissenting).
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (defining murder as "the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus with malice aforethought").
38. See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997).
39. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b) (West 1987) (excluding prosecution of "the
pregnant woman"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (b)(3) (West 1988) (providing that the
statute should not apply if "[t]he act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the
mother of the fetus").
40. See Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). In this case, an
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that the purpose of the state's vehicular
homicide statute was to protect human life and that a "viable human fetus is nothing less
than human life." Id. at 734.
41. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984). In Home, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that its previous ruling that a wrongful death action could be maintained
for a viable, unborn fetus compelled the conclusion that the state's homicide statute included
within its definition of "person" a viable, unborn fetus. See id. at 704. The court noted that
"[it would be grossly inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the
purpose of imposing civil liability while refusing to give a similar classification in the criminal
context." Id.
42. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984). In this case, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the term "person" as used in the vehicular
homicide statute included viable fetuses. See id. at 1325. In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that in using the term "person" within its wrongful death statute, the
legislature did not intend for there to be a distinction between an unborn fetus and a human
being. See id. In Cass, the defendant struck a female pedestrian who was nearly nine
months pregnant and the fetus was later delivered by Caesarian section stillborn. See id.
The autopsy revealed that the fetus was viable prior to the accident and had died as a result
of the injuries it sustained from the accident. See id.
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With respect to penalties, some states impose the death penalty
for fetal homicide, while in others the maximum sentence is
mandatory life imprisonment.43 For example, California considers
the murder of a viable fetus as justification for the imposition of
the death penalty.' In Massachusetts, a defendant can be pun-
ished by death or life imprisonment for the death of a viable
fetus;45 while in Minnesota, a defendant is sentenced to life in
prison for killing a fetus anytime after conception.46 Georgia
imposes a punishment of life in prison for the death of a quick
fetus.
4 7
Until the passage of the Act, Pennsylvania did not criminally
penalize a third person for harming a fetus.4 8 Fetal rights were
only recognized in civil law where a viable fetus was permitted to
be the subject of a wrongful death suit.49
III. History of Fetal Rights in Pennsylvania
In Amadio v. Levin," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether a viable, stillborn fetus had the same rights
under Pennsylvania's Wrongful-Death Statutes 51 as an infant who
was born alive. 52  The court held that a wrongful death action
could be brought on behalf of a fully developed stillborn fetus.
53
The court reasoned that it was illogical to permit a cause of action
to be maintained on behalf of a child who survived only an instant
outside the womb, yet deny the same right to a fully developed
fetus that was capable of an independent existence prior to its
43. See Bicka A. Barlow, Comment, Severe Penalties for the Destruction of "Potential
Life" - Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 463, 503 (1995).
44. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994). The Davis Court cited to People v.
Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730, 752 (Cal. 1989), which held that the killing of a fetus constituted
murder within the meaning of the state's "multiple-murder special circumstance." Davis, 872
P.2d at 596. Thus, California will consider the murder of a viable fetus as one murder for
purposes of the "multiple-murder special circumstance," in turn justifying the imposition of
the death penalty. See Hamilton, 774 P.2d at 752.
45. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
46. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 1987).
47. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(b) (1992).
48. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998).
49. See infra Part III.
50. 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985).
51. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (West 1982).
52. See Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1085.
53. See id. at 1086.
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demise.54 In concluding that the "live birth" of a child is not
determinative of that child's status as an individual under Pennsyl-
vania's survival55 and wrongful death statutes, 56 the court provid-
ed that, in a civil lawsuit, damages could be sought for the wrongful
death of an unborn child.57 The court did not address the issue of
whether a cause of action exists for a non-viable fetus.
58
Subsequent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have
found that for purposes of civil liability a "person" is a viable fetus
or one capable of taking a breath outside the mother's womb. In
Hudak v. Georgy,59 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that
wrongful death and survival acts did not create a cause of action
for non-viable fetuses. 6 In Hudak, the parents attempted to bring
a wrongful death and survival action on behalf of their non-viable,
triplet fetuses that died shortly after their premature birth.61
However, the court "reaffirm[ed] the ... proposition that an infant
born alive is, without qualification, a person., 6' Likewise, in
Coveleski v. Bubnis,63 a pregnant woman who was injured in an
automobile accident brought suit to recover not only for her own
injuries, but also for the death of her eight week old fetus that was
aborted to avoid the risk of fetal damage.64 The court found that
"in order to maintain an action for wrongful death or surviv-
al ... [the child] must be either ... born alive or a viable fetus
capable of independent existence at the time of death.,
65
With regard to criminal law, prior to the enactment of The
Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act, "intentional malicious
conduct which result[ed] in the death of an unborn child [was] not
punishable as a crime."' Only if the child was "born alive" and
54. See id. at 1089.
55. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302.
56. See id. § 8301.
57. See Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1086-87 ("[W]e conclude that the time has arrived for us
to . . . recognize that survival and wrongful death lie by the estates of stillborn children for
fatal injuries they received while viable children [in the womb]").
58. See id.
59. 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993).
60. See id. at 602.
61. See id. at 600.
62. Id. at 603.
63. 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993).
64. See id. at 609.
65. Id. at 610 (citing Hudak v. Gregory, 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993); Amadio v. Levin, 501
A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985)).
66. Russell, supra note 9, at 2.
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then died as a result of the injuries inflicted upon the child was it
possible to convict the perpetrator of a crime.67 Thus, a person
who intentionally set out to kill or seriously injure a pregnant
woman's baby and succeeded in doing so could not have been
punished for killing or injuring that baby under previous criminal
laws.
The only Pennsylvania case that dealt with criminal charges
involving an unborn child did not set precedent.68 In Westmore-
land County a woman was charged with delivery of controlled
substances after taking drugs while pregnant, thereby addicting her
unborn child.6 9 The Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to find
the woman "guilty of charges of delivering drugs, recklessly
endangering another person or endangering the welfare of a
child."7"
In Pennsylvania, the fetus generally has not been recognized
as a person under the Criminal Code.71 Prior to the Act, the only
time it was considered a crime to kill a fetus in Pennsylvania was
when a pregnant woman underwent an illegal late-term abortion
for non-medical reasons.72 This crime has been rarely prosecuted
and has not been classified as homicide.73 Even when prosecuted,
a late-term abortion constitutes a violation of Pennsylvania's
abortion law and carries a less-severe penalty.74 Until the devel-
opment of the Act, the closest Pennsylvania came to acknowledging
the severity of fetal homicide in criminal law was a 1996 law
allowing prosecutors to seek the death penalty if a woman is killed
in her third trimester of pregnancy.75  Pennsylvania's views
regarding the unborn child, however, have significantly changed in
67. See id.
68. See Debbi Garlicki, Driver Pleads Guilty in Fetus' Death. A PA Bill to Create New
Crimes of Homicide Against the Unborn Child Awaits Ridge's OK, ALLENTOWN MORNING
CALL, Oct. 2, 1997, at Al.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Evans, supra note 3, at D12.
72. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210 (West 1983).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d)(17) (West 1997). The enactment of this
law was prompted by the murders of Stephanie McDuffey and Renee Ann Layser. See
Delsite, supra note 11, at Fl. McDuffey, a twenty-three year old Harrisburg woman, was
nearly nine months pregnant when she was murdered. See id. Layser was nearly seven
months pregnant with her first child when she was shot to death by her ex-boyfriend after
the couple argued about child support payments. See id.
1998]
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criminal law. By establishing new crimes of homicide against the
unborn, the Act is recognition of the fetus as an independent
being.76
IV. The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act
Pursuant to the Act, it is criminal homicide77 to intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently cause the death of an unborn
child.78 The law establishes that life begins at conception and uses
the term "unborn child" to refer to a fetus at any state of gesta-
tion.79 The legislation establishes the crimes of first,8" second,81
and third degree8 2 murder as well as voluntary manslaughter83
and, in the case of injury to the unborn child, aggravated assault.8
With respect to penalties, the Pennsylvania Criminal Code provides
that the punishment imposed on individuals who kill an unborn
child are equivalent to those that apply to anyone convicted of
killing another person. 5  There is one exception: "the death
76. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998).
77. See id. § 2603(b). "Criminal Homicide of an unborn child [is] ... classified as
murder of an unborn child or voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child." Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. § 3203 (defining an unborn child as "an individual [human being] from
fertilization until live birth.").
80. See id. § 2604(a)(1). "A criminal homicide of an unborn child constitutes first
degree murder.., when it is committed by an intentional killing." Id.
81. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2604(b)(1). "A criminal homicide of an unborn
child [is] ... second degree murder ... when it is committed while the defendant was
engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony." Id.
82. See id. § 2604(c)(1). Third degree murder is all other kinds of murder of an unborn
child. See id.
83. See id. § 2605(a). Section 2605(a) provides that any individual
[w]ho kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary
manslaughter of an unborn child if, at the time of the killing, [the individual] ... is
acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation [by
either] the mother of the unborn child whom the [individual] ... endeavors to kill,
but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of [an] ... unborn child or
[by] another [person] whom the [individual] ... endeavors to kill, but he
negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child.
Id. In addition, the legislation provides for unreasonable belief. See id. Voluntary
manslaughter occurs if an individual intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child when
"at the time of the killing [the individual] ... believes the circumstances to be such that, if
they existed, would justify the killing, . . . but his belief is unreasonable." Id.
84. See id. § 2606(a). "A person commits aggravated assault of an unborn child if he
attempts to cause serious bodily injury to the unborn child or [in fact] causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances [exhibiting] ... an extreme
indifference to the life of the unborn child." Id.
85. See Reeves, supra note 8, at B8.
[Vol. 103:1
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penalty [cannot] be imposed upon someone convicted of first-
degree murder of an unborn child." 6 Thus, life in prison is the
maximum penalty for killing an unborn child.87 In addition, the
Act's criminal provisions do not apply to consensual abortion nor
do they apply to doctors engaged in a good-faith medical prac-
tice.88 Furthermore, the legislation does not impose any criminal
penalty upon the pregnant woman for crimes against her unborn
child.89 By passing The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act,9"
Pennsylvania has followed twenty-five other states that have
recognized the rights of a fetus in criminal law.9t Similar to
Illinois' and Minnesota's fetal homicide legislation,92 Pennsylva-
nia's law renders a defendant liable for homicide when causing the
death of a fetus that is no more than the unity of a sperm and an
egg.
93
Illinois' feticide statute provides for five separate offenses
including intentional homicide of an unborn child, 94 voluntary
manslaughter of an unborn child,95 involuntary manslaughter of an
unborn child,96 battery of an unborn child,97 and aggravated
battery of an unborn child.98 With respect to intentional homicide
of an unborn child, the statute provides that a person commits the
offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if "he or she
either intended to cause the death of or do great bodily harm to
the pregnant woman or her unborn child." 99 "Unborn child" is
defined as "any individual of the human species from fertilization
until birth."100  If convicted under the statute, a defendant re-
ceives the same sentence as a defendant convicted of first-degree
murder, except that the death penalty cannot be implemented.'0 1
86. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(2).
87. See Reeves, supra note 8, at B8; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(1).
88. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2608(a).
89. See Reeves, supra note 8, at B8.
90. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609.
91. See Krebs, supra note 9, at Al.
92. See infra notes 94-105.
93. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203.
94. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 1996).
95. See id. at 5/9-2.1.
96. See id. at 5/9-3.2.
97. See id. at 5/12-3.1.
98. See id. at 5/12-4.4.
99. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(a)(2).
100. Id. at (b)(1).
101. See id. at (d).
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In addition, Illinois requires that the defendant have knowledge
that the woman assaulted was pregnant."t 2 Similarly, the Minne-
sota statute includes the crime of murder of an unborn child in the
first degree,1 13 defining the term "unborn child" as "the unborn
offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born.""' A
defendant convicted pursuant to this statute is sentenced to life in
prison."5
Wisconsin's fetal homicide bill, which was currently passed by
the state Assembly, provides that an individual who harms or kills
a fetus would face penalties up to life in prison. 106 The proposal,
identical to Illinois' statute, defines an unborn child for purposes of
crimes and penalties as any human being from conception until
birth.10 7 In addition to abortion, exceptions to prosecution under
the bill include customary medical acts performed by a physician,
an act by a health care provider in accordance with a pregnant
woman's power of attorney for health care, an act by a pregnant
woman towards her fetus, and the use of any medication or device
for birth control or pregnancy prevention.
1 8
Thus, the Illinois and Minnesota legislatures have eliminated
both the common law "born alive" rule as well as any viability
requirement. Pennsylvania, with Wisconsin trailing closely behind,
has now joined these states that recognize the rights of a fetus from
the moment of conception.0 9
V. Future Implications of the Act
A. A Misunderstanding of Roe v. Wade
While many critics question whether Pennsylvania's fetal
homicide legislation is a toe in the door to undermining abortion
rights,"0 others are convinced that the law is nothing more than
102. See id. at (a)(1)-(3).
103. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266-.2662 (West 1997). The Minnesota legislature
includes in its definition of first degree murder the killing of "an unborn child with
premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another." Id.
§ 609.2661(1).
104. Id. § 609.266(a).
105. See id. § 609.2661.
106. See Sharon Theimer, Fetal Homicide Bill Clears Assembly, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
POL. SERV., June 11, 1997, at 1.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998).
110. See Reeves, supra note 8, at B8.
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a grand scheme of the anti-abortion forces.'11 Pennsylvania's pro-
choice forces believe the Act is merely a maneuver by abortion
opponents to muddy the legal waters surrounding abortion, while
affirming the stance that a fetus has individual guarantees."1 2
Although it is evident that the Act acknowledges the individual
rights of the fetus in criminal law, contrary to belief, the law's
passage will not lead to an erosion of constitutionally protected
abortion rights because of one essential distinction: that of a
woman's right of choice regarding her health and body versus an
assailant's unilateral right to destroy her fetus out of malice or
recklessness."3
Much of the controversy surrounding the Act is due to a
misconception of Roe v. Wade.11 a Critics of the Act contend that
establishing that a fetus has "personhood" at any state of gestation
threatens to undermine the long-standing principles pronounced in
Roe.1 5 However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe is inapplica-
ble in a state that criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the
mother's consent."
6
The landmark decision of Roe balanced a mother's constitu-
tional privacy interest in her body against a state's interest in
protecting fetal life."7 The Court in Roe determined that in the
context of a mother's abortion decision, the state had no compel-
ling interest in protecting a fetus until it reached the point of
viability, or when it reached the "capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb., 118  The Supreme Court, however,
refrained from answering the question of when life begins for a
111. See Krebs, supra note 9, at Al.
112. See id.
113. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318
(Minn. 1990); People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See State Bill on Fetal Death is Mischief, supra note 9, at A22.
116. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 596.
117. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
118. Id. at 163. The Supreme Court held that prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the decision regarding abortion and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the woman's physician. See id. Subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State may regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to
maternal health. See id. The Court indicated that at the state subsequent to viability, the
State may regulate or proscribe abortion except when it is necessary in appropriate medical
judgment for the preservation of life or health of the pregnant woman. See id.
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fetus in its mother's womb.'19 Rather, the Court recognized a
woman's fundamental right to privacy and found that this right was
broad enough to encompass a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy.12° Thus, the focus of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Roe was on protecting a woman from governmental intrusion when
deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to term. 2' To truly
comprehend the right pronounced in Roe, one must consider both
the woman's interest and the nature of the state's interference with
that interest.
22
Subsequent court decisions have confirmed the premise that
the well-founded principles of Roe are irrelevant when assessing the
constitutionality of their state's fetal homicide legislation.123  For
example, in People v. Davis,'24 the California Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the viability principles of Roe must be
applied to California's fetal homicide statute. 25  The court
emphasized that the Supreme Court's decision in Roe forbids the
state's protection of the unborn's interest only when it conflicts
with the protected interest of the mother.12 6 The court noted that
"[w]e conclude, therefore, that when the mother's privacy interests
are not at stake, the Legislature may determine whether, and at
what point, it should protect life inside a mother's womb from
homicide.'
127
119. See id. at 159. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Blackmun stated that "[w]hen
those trained in the respective disciplines of medical, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id.
120. See id. at 170.
121. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990).
122. See id. at 322. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), held that "the essential holding of Roe should be retained and
once again reaffirmed." Id. at 846. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the following three
aspects of Roe: (1) the right of a woman to choose an abortion before fetal viability; (2) the
state's authority to restrict abortions after viability if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies that threaten the health of the mother; and (3) the state has a legitimate interest
in protecting the health of a woman and the life of her fetus. See id. Rejecting Roe's trimes-
ter framework, the undue burden test was implemented by the Supreme Court in Casey in
evaluating abortion restrictions prior to viability. See id. at 874.
123. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994); Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321;
People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
124. 872 P.2d at 591. Davis involved a defendant convicted of murdering a fetus during
the course of a robbery. See id.
125. See id. at 599.
126. See id. at 596.
127. Id. at 599.
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In addition to the California Supreme Court, the appellate
courts of Illinois and Minnesota have found that protection of a
woman's privacy interest in the realm of abortion is irrelevant to a
nonconsensual homicide of an unborn child.128 Illinois' feticide
statute was first challenged in People v. Ford129 on the basis that
the statute violated equal protection and due process principles for
failing to distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses.3 °
The defendant, relying on Roe, argued that a woman can destroy
her nonviable fetus without incurring criminal liability and has a
constitutional right to an abortion within her first trimester.1
3 '
The defendant contended, however, that if he destroys a nonviable
fetus he is susceptible to criminal penalties." 2  As such, the
defendant insisted that he and a pregnant woman are similarly
situated individuals being treated dissimilarly in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution."'
The Illinois appellate court rejected this argument and held
that a pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy
and a defendant who assaults a pregnant woman killing her fetus
are not similarly situated. 34  The court, in drawing this distinc-
tion, reasoned that a woman has a privacy interest in terminating
her pregnancy whereas a defendant who assaults a pregnant woman
has no such interest." 5 Likewise, the court disposed of the defen-
dant's due process challenge by concluding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague. 13'6  Because the statute defined an
"unborn child" as "any individual of the human species from
fertilization until birth,"" 7 the court found that it was unnecessary
to establish what life is and when life begins."' Instead, the court
determined that it must assess whether the particular entity once
128. See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321-22; Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1199.
129. 581 N.E.2d 1189.
130. See id. at 1198. In Ford, the defendant stomped on the stomach of his seventeen
year old stepdaughter who was five-and-a-half months pregnant thereby killing the fetus. See
id. at 1190.
131. See id. at 1199.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1199.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1200.
137. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9-1.2(b)(1) (West); see also id.
138. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1200.
19981
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had life and no longer does as a result of the defendant's con-
duct.'39
In reaching these conclusions, the Illinois appellate court relied
substantially on a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that
rejected equal protection and due process challenges to a feticide
statute by a defendant who had murdered a woman and her four
week old embryo. 41 In dismissing the defendant's constitutional
challenge that the statute violated equal protection because an
unborn child lacks "personhood" under Roe, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in State v. Merrill1 41 noted that Roe's focus was on
protecting the woman from governmental interference when she
was deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy.142 More impor-
tantly, the court emphasized that Roe recognized that the state "has
still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.' ' 143  The Minnesota Supreme Court
further revealed that this interest includes protection of the unborn
child, whether viable or not, while extending protection to the
woman's right to decide whether to carry the pregnancy to
term.' 44  In holding that the viability of the fetus is "simply
immaterial" to an equal protection challenge, the court reasoned
that the rights of a criminal assailant in terminating a woman's
pregnancy were not at issue.'45
Like the feticide statutes in California, Illinois, and Minnesota,
Pennsylvania's fetal homicide legislation seeks to protect the
"potentiality of human life" without impinging upon a pregnant
woman's privacy interests. This interest in preserving the "potenti-
ality of human life" includes protection of the unborn child
regardless of its stage of development while protecting the woman's
interest in her unborn child and her right to choose whether to
139. See id. at 1200-01.
140. See id. at 1199-1201. The court relied on State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn.
1990). In this case, the victim died from a gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant. See
id. at 319. At the time, the victim was pregnant with a twenty-seven or twenty-eight day old
embryo. See id. The coroner concluded that there was not abnormality that would have
caused a miscarriage and that the death of the fetus resulted from the death of its mother.
See id.
141. 450 N.W.2d 318.
142. See id. at 322.
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carry her pregnancy to term.146  Because a woman's privacy
interest is not at stake, Pennsylvania may determine whether and
at what point it can protect life inside the mother's womb from
homicide. 47 Moreover, the imposition of criminal penalties upon
those who commit acts against unborn children protects the
potentiality of life because the threat of severe penalties for crimes
against the unborn will deter others from committing similar
crimes."4  With Pennsylvania's fetal homicide legislation, a
woman's freedom of choice concerning abortion is preserved and
can exist in conjunction with fetal rights under the Illinois and
Minnesota courts' analysis. Thus, if the Pennsylvania criminal
courts apply the reasoning set forth by the Illinois and Minnesota
courts, The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act would most
likely survive a constitutional attack. Both Ford and Merrill
demonstrate that criminalization of the killing of a fetus without
regard to viability is not violative of privacy principles.'49 These
cases also indicate that the legislature is free to impose upon the
murderer of a fetus the same penalty as is prescribed for the
murder of a human being. As such, the Pennsylvania criminal
courts should find Roe inapplicable since that decision protects a
woman's right of choice and does not protect, much less confer on
a third party assailant, a right to destroy a fetus.
150
Furthermore, similar to other states,151 the Act expressly
distinguishes fetal homicide from abortion. 52 Abortion is specifi-
cally excluded from the criminal provisions of the Act which
provide that the law does not apply to consensual abortion.'53
This language is indicative of legislative intent to ensure that The
Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act does not rattle the status
quo of legalized abortion in Pennsylvania. 54  Additionally, those
146. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994).
147. See id.
148. See People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
149. See supra notes 129-145 and accompanying text.
150. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 599; Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321; Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1199.
151. See Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). In Hughes, the Oklaho-
ma Court of Criminal Appeals was adamant in indicating that for purposes of the vehicular
homicide statute, a viable fetus is equivalent to human life, stating that "[wie wish to make
it absolutely clear that our holding shall not affect a woman's choice to choose a lawful
abortion .... " Id. at 734-35.
152. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2608 (West 1998).
153. See id.
154. See Krebs supra note 6, at Al; Reeves, supra note 8, at B8.
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representing Governor Ridge have maintained that the law
specifically does not apply to abortion but was intended to protect
doctors, fertility clinics, and other medical practitioners in their
work. 5' The issue, therefore, is whether a woman's choice is
denied because of the murder of her unborn child.156 The Act,
in recognizing that when a pregnant woman is attacked there are
two victims rather than one, was intended to make it a crime for
someone other than the mother to end a pregnancy.' 57 In fact,
legislators who voted in favor of the Act were motivated by a
desire to address the grief felt by a family after the death of their
child.'58
B. Prosecution For Fetal-Endangerment
As previously stated, The Crimes Against the Unborn Child
Act expressly exempts from its criminal provisions the prosecution
of the pregnant woman with respect to crimes against her unborn
child.'59 Nevertheless, advocates for the rights of women vehe-
mently oppose Pennsylvania's new law fearing that the measure
could be used against them.16° Specifically, opponents of the Act
fear that expecting mothers who are alcoholics or drug addicts will
be exposed to prosecution. These critics point their fingers to
instances in other states, such as South Carolina and Wisconsin,
where pregnant women have been prosecuted for behavior
considered inappropriate for their fetuses.' 6
In 1997, in an unprecedented decision that is most likely bound
for the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme
Court became the first high court in the nation to permit prosecu-
tion for child abuse for prenatal conduct that endangered an
unborn child. 63  In Whitner v. State," the South Carolina Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction of twenty-eight year old
155. See Reeves, supra note 8, at B8.
156. See id.
157. See supra note 152.
158. See Bill to Punish Fetal Homicide Poorly Done, supra note 9, at A26.
159. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2608 (West 1998).
160. See Delsite, supra note 11, at Fl.
161. See id.
162. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
163. See Lyle Denniston, Abortion, Fetus Rights on Legal Collision Course; Protections
for Unborn Head for Test in Florida, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 4,1996, at IA; Fetal Rights
Gaining in Civil, Criminal Law, W. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 5, 1996, at 1.
164. 492 S.E.2d 777.
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Cornelia Whitner for criminal child neglect for ingesting cocaine
during her pregnancy.165  Consequently, Whitner's son was born
with cocaine metabolites in his system.166  The court reasoned
that the word "child" as used in South Carolina's Children's Code
includes viable fetuses.167  Furthermore, the court argued that it
would be "absurd" to recognize a viable fetus as a person for
purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes, but not for
purposes of statutes prohibiting child abuse.1 61 South Carolina,
the court observed, has "long recognized that viable fetuses are
persons holding certain rights and privileges.,
169
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Moore argued that the
majority's broad interpretation of the Children's Code could
impose criminal liability upon women for "myriad acts" during
pregnancy such as failing to obtain prenatal care, take vitamins, or
eat properly, or for drinking and smoking.17° Justice Moore
further contended that it was unrealistic for the court to ignore the
future ramifications the decision could have on pregnant wom-
en.1 ' Additional critics noted that the effect of the South Caroli-
na Supreme Court's decision is to eliminate third trimester
abortions in South Carolina even to save the mother's health. 72
At the time Whitner's fetus was affected by her cocaine use,
Whitner was in her final trimester of pregnancy.'73 The South
165. See id. at 786.
166. See id. at 778.
167. See id. at 780. The version of the statute under which Whitner was charged
provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who
shall ... refuse or neglect to provide ... the proper care and attention for such
child or helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless
person is endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1997).
168. See Whiner, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
169. Id. at 779; see also State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984). In Home, the
defendant attacked his wife with a knife wounding her in the abdomen, neck, and arms. See
id. at 704. While the mother survived the attack, her full term fetus suffocated as a result
of the mother's blood loss. See id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that "[iut
would be grossly inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purpose
of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal
context." Id. The court ultimately concluded that a viable fetus was a person within the
confines of South Carolina's homicide statute. See id.
170. See id. at 788.
171. See id.




Carolina Supreme Court ruled that, by that time, the fetus had
become a "person." '174
Likewise, in Wisconsin on June 10, 1996, thirty-five year old
Deborah Zimmerman was charged with attempted first degree
homicide for her conduct prior to her daughter Meagan's birth.'75
For the first time in the United States, a prosecutor applied a
murder statute in a case in which a fetus had not met its de-
mise.176 Zimmerman, drunk and nearly nine months pregnant,
arrived at the hospital screaming, "If you don't keep me here, I'm
just going to go home and keep drinking and drink myself to death
and I'm going to kill this thing because I don't want it any-
ways." '177 Later that night, Zimmerman gave birth to Meagan
whose blood alcohol level was .199, nearly twice the legal limit of
intoxication in Wisconsin.17 As a result, Meagan now suffers
from symptoms associated with fetal alcohol syndrome.7 9 In this
case, the court refused to dismiss attempted murder and reckless
injury charges against Zimmerman. 18' Here, Wisconsin made it
clear that even prenatal conduct that is not itself illegal could be
made criminal. 8 '
No one would champion an expectant mother who deliberately
inflicts harm on her child by abusing illegal substances and drugs.
In fact, the majority of Americans believe that a mother should be
held criminally liable when her substance abuse results in impair-
ment of her child.'82 Approximately two hundred women in
more than thirty states have been criminally charged for engaging
in harmful conduct during their pregnancies.'83 Yet, for the most
174. See id.
175. See Amanda E. Vedrich, Comment, Prosecuting Pregnant Women: Should




179. See Don Terry, Mom Charged with Attempted Murder in Fetal Alcohol Case, THE
HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Aug. 17, 1996, at A4.
180. See Dave Daley, Racine County Mother Fetal Homicide Charge May Not Stick,
Experts Say Legislature's Failure to Pass "Feticide" Bill May Jeopardize Case, THE
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1.
181. See Denniston, supra note 163, at 1A.
182. See Julia Elizabeth Jones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV.
1159, 1159 n.3 (1992) (citing pole results indicating that 52% of Americans believe that it is
acceptable to impose criminal liability on a mother if that mother's substance abuse results
in harm to the child).
183. See Denniston, supra note 163, at 1A.
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part, prosecutors throughout the country have failed to make
charges stick against pregnant women whose behavior harmed their
fetuses.'
Unlike South Carolina and Wisconsin, Pennsylvania acted
appropriately when it excluded the prosecution of women for fetal
abuse from its legislation.85 If Pennsylvania should extend the
law to encompass the prosecution of pregnant women for harming
their own fetuses, the Act would also face an uphill battle in
defeating constitutional challenges. Imposing criminal liability upon
a pregnant woman for her prenatal conduct is a violation of the
right to privacy and the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.
186
1. Prosecution Violates a Mother's Right to Equal Protec-
tion.-The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' 87 The Equal Protection Clause ensures that similarly
situated persons will be treated similarly protecting both women
and men from discrimination on the basis of gender.188 A classifi-
cation based upon gender exists when a state enacts a maternal
drug abuse statute singling out pregnant women for punishment
while similar conduct engaged in by men or non-pregnant women
remains immune.189 Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
statutes containing gender-based classifications or discrimination
must withstand an intermediate level of judicial review. 9° Thus,
a gender-based classification must facilitate an important govern-
184. See Courts Refusing to Punish Women Who Hurt Fetuses, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 2, 1997, at 3A. Presently, nine states have rejected arguments that pregnant women
should be criminally liable for child abuse or for taking drugs. See id. For example, in
Florida, criminal charges were brought against a woman who shot herself in the abdomen
when she was six months pregnant because she did not want to have another child and could
not afford an abortion. See Lyle Denniston, Florida High Court Upholds Woman's Right
Over Fetus; Six Months Pregnant, Woman Shoots Herself in the Abdomen, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, Oct. 31, 1997, at 4A. Striking down the criminal charges, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that while someone could be held responsible for killing someone else's fetus, a
pregnant woman could not be prosecuted for taking any action to harm her own fetus. See
id.
185. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2608 (West 1998).
186. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
188. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
189. See Donna L. Castro, Student Work, Whitner v. South Carolina: Prosecution for
Child Abuse Extends Into the Womb, 48 S.C. L. REv. 657, 662 (1997).
190. See Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
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mental objective and must be substantially related to accomplishing
this objective. 91
Extending Pennsylvania's fetal homicide statute to include
pregnant women would have a retroactive effect on women. As
such, to survive intermediate level scrutiny Pennsylvania would
need to establish a reason to burden only women and not men.
While it is evident that this inclusion in Pennsylvania's statute
would achieve an important governmental objective of protecting
potential human life, it is also evident that a pregnant woman is not
the only individual responsible for harming her fetus.'92 Third
persons as well as the environment can contribute to causing
detrimental effects to a fetus. t 93  For example, studies indicate
that the sperm of male substance abusers can cause defects in an
unborn child even if the mother herself does not use drugs.
1 94
Further, women may inadvertently be subjected to toxic chemicals
in the work environment. 95 Evidence also suggests that living
with a cigarette smoker may have harmful effects on the fetus.
196
Accordingly, imposing criminal liability only upon pregnant
women's conduct when there are other factors contributing to
adverse effects on the fetus is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause because such liability is not
substantially related to accomplishing its objective of protecting
human life.
2. An Infringement on the Fundamental Right to Priva-
cy.-While the United States Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy, this right is an integral right that has
been recognized since 1891.197 The United States Supreme Court
has indicated that only personal rights deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in the
guarantee of personal privacy. 98 The state is prohibited from
191. See id.
192. See Tiffany M. Romney, Comment, Prosecuting Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies:
The State's Interest in Protecting the Rights of a Fetus Versus the Mother's Constitutional
Rights to Due Process, Privacy and Equal Protection, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 325, 340 (1991).
193. See id.
194. See Jones, supra note 182, at 1165. Studies reveal that morphine or methadone
affect sperm. See id.
195. See Romney, supra note 192, at 339.
196. See id.
197. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
198. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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unjustifiably interfering with personal decisions regarding mar-
riage,199 family relationships,2 0 contraception,2"1 child rearing
and education,0 2 and procreation.2 3 Justice Brandeis character-
ized "the right to be let alone" as "the right most valued by
civilized men.
' 204
Although the state may have an interest in protecting a fetus,
this interest does not outweigh the mother's right to privacy. If
Pennsylvania were to include the prosecution of pregnant women
within the confines of the Act, there would be a violation of a
woman's right to procreate and her right to autonomy in reproduc-
tive decision-making. The imposition of criminal prosecution upon
a pregnant addict could force her to either carry her pregnancy to
term, thereby facing criminal sanctions, or to have an abortion as
the only way to escape prison. In effect, a pregnant addict must
choose between continuing her drug habit or ending the life of her
unborn child. With this approach, a woman may be better off to
illegally abort in her third trimester and face a two year sentence
than give birth after taking drugs and face a ten year sentence.2 5
More importantly, it is illogical to impose criminal penalties upon
a woman for harming a fetus that she could legally abort. The Act
has deemed a fetus a "person" from the moment of conception.
Allowing a woman to legally have an abortion at this time but to
render her criminally liable for harming her fetus through the use
of drugs or other inappropriate behavior is inconsistent.
Pregnant drug addicts who seek treatment either face difficulty
in obtaining assistance or are unable to receive treatment.2 6
Studies reveal that pregnant women are discriminated against in
drug treatment programs. 2 7  Without assistance from a drug
treatment program, it is difficult for an addict to stop using drugs.
199. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
200. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
201. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
202. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
203. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
204. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
205. See Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on Pregnant Drug Users:
Throwing the Baby Out with the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L. J. 410, 424 (1993).
206. See id.; see also Jones, supra note 182, at 1177 (discussing various obstacles that
confront an addicted pregnant woman when seeking treatment).
207. See id. These programs often deny treatment to pregnant women or expel them
when discovering the pregnancy. See James Andrew Freeman, Pre-natal Substance Abuse:
Texas, Texans and Future Texans Can't Afford It, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 554 (1996).
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Under these circumstances, women are being punished for their
choice to carry a pregnancy to term.
In many instances, the threat of prosecuting a mother for her
prenatal conduct will deter pregnant women from obtaining pre-
natal care.2 °8 Pregnant women are terrified that they will be
punished or have their newborns taken away if there is evidence
they acted inappropriately during pregnancy.2 9 As a result, a
mother's pregnancy will go unmonitored and any possible defects
will go undetected, which in turn increases harm to the fetus. In
this scenario, an unborn child that could have received pre-natal
care is now denied the opportunity.
A woman's substance abuse while pregnant should be treated
as a health problem, not as a crime. Ultimately, the solution
should be prevention and treatment. If Pennsylvania were to
expand the Act's well drawn boundaries to include maternal
conduct as a crime against the fetus, then criminal prosecutions
could dangerously spread to any behavior that might be detrimental
to the fetus. What behavior would constitute "harm" to a fetus?
Drinking? Smoking? Failure to receive prenatal care? Sex?
Justice Moore correctly recognized that the government should not
be granted a significant role in overseeing pregnancies.
21
Pennsylvania should be commended for excluding the
prosecution of maternal conduct from its fetal homicide legislation.
Holding women criminally liable for their maternal conduct likely
would not withstand a constitutional right to privacy challenge.
After all, criminal laws are intended to protect, not punish women.
VI. Conclusion
Finally, Pennsylvania is in line with half the states in recogniz-
ing potential human life in criminal law. The Crimes Against the
Unborn Child Act renders a fetus to be a human being from the
moment of conception and a person in the eyes of Pennsylvania
criminal law. Accordingly, those who assault a pregnant woman
and cause the death of her fetus will no longer remain immune to
criminal penalties.
208. See Freeman, supra note 207, at 554.
209. See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable - "Roe v. Wade Does Not Prevent
Prosecution of Pre-Natal Abuse," A.B.A.J. 50 (1990).
210. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 788 (S.C. 1997) (Moore, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 103:1
THE CRIMES AGAINST THE UNBORN CHILD AcT
Contrary to belief, the development of the Act will not curtail
a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. The principles pro-
nounced in Roe v. Wade are inapplicable to statutes that criminalize
the killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. The Roe
decision protects a woman's right of choice and does not protect,
much less bestow on an assailant, the right to destroy a fetus. As
such, Pennsylvania has the authority to protect life inside a
woman's womb from homicide. If Pennsylvania's courts apply the
reasoning set forth by the Illinois and Minnesota courts, it is likely
that the Act will surpass constitutional challenges.
Further, Pennsylvania's legislature should be applauded for
exempting from its criminal provisions the prosecution of pregnant
women with respect to crimes against their unborn children.
Pregnancy should not be viewed as a crime; rather, a woman's
substance abuse problem should be perceived as a health problem.
Cari L. Leventhal
1998]

